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Exploring Myths about Manufactured Housing: 
The Truth(s) behind One of America’s Least Understood 
Financial Markets
Adam Rust
Imagine that you are in a conversation about the 
state of affordable housing.
 Such a conversation might discuss the dilemmas 
faced by important elements of the workforce, the 
pressures of run-ups in pricing brought about by 
creative ﬁnancing products, and the local constraints in 
metropolitan areas. Such a conversation might discuss the 
important actors in the ﬁeld, from state housing ﬁnance 
agencies to nonproﬁt developers to policy advocates.
 Nonetheless, such a conversation might not broach 
the appropriate role played by manufactured housing. 
In doing so, the discussion would ignore the largest source 
of unsubsidized housing in the country. In the South, 
the omission would be even more glaring. Regionally, 
manufactured housing accounted for forty percent of 
all housing sold in low-income home purchases in the 
1990s.
 Now realize that this imaginary viewpoint is largely 
the one that governs the approach that many non-proﬁts 
take to affordable housing. As one developer in Kentucky 
is famously said to have observed, “Manufactured housing 
and community development--an oxymoron!”1   
 It does not stop with non-proﬁts. Many state housing 
ﬁnance agencies, whose mission is to provide for the 
funds that fuel the creation of more affordable housing, 
systemically disqualify manufactured housing from their 
lending portfolios. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, whose 
charters mandate them to support access to ﬁnancing, 
limit their participation in manufactured housing to that 
small portion of all manufactured homes that attain a 
legal designation as “real property.” 
 Nationwide, non-proﬁts and housing cooperatives 
own about 25,000 manufactured homes.2 This is just a 
fraction of the homes in the portfolios of community 
development groups.  Another 30,000 mobile homes 
beneﬁt from some kind of government-aided rental 
subsidy (Section 8).3  The vast majority of tenants in 
parks are forced to ﬁnance their housing entirely through 
private suppliers. 
 The pre-existing perceptions that surround 
manufactured housing explain a lot about the actions of 
its important stakeholders in the development process.4
Scared off by the wave of foreclosures ﬁve years ago, 
many lenders approach the sector with fear.  Frequent 
pejorative references to “trailer parks” in the lexicon 
of community development leaders,5 realtors, and 
even planners6 create a chorus of NIMBYism about the 
sector. 
 The industry continues to struggle. Only 130,748 
manufactured homes were shipped in 2004, a steep fall 
from the 377,000 that were sold in 1998.7 There are a 
number of reasons behind this decline.  Those problems 
reﬂect less about the product itself and more about 
changes in factors surrounding manufactured housing. 
For one, less ﬁnancing is available.  Even FHA ﬁnancing 
has declined.  Furthermore, circumstantial evidence 
points to persistent erosion in the supply of mobile home 
parks in urban areas.  At the same time, innovation in 
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mortgage products (adjustable rate mortgages, interest-
only mortgages, etc.) has lowered some of the obstacles 
to owning stick-built homes. Over the last four years, 
shipments have averaged 126,000 units (excluding sales 
to FEMA), just a third of the 1998 ﬁgure.
 The traditional trailer park is also affected.  Though 
borrowers want the affordability offered by the sector, 
many are ﬁnding it beneﬁcial to choose land-home over 
land-lease.8 Park owners, holding land that fewer and 
fewer residents want to lease, entertain the idea of closing 
parks and selling the land.
 Some community advocates say it is all bad – all 
abandoned trailer parks, all depreciating assets. These 
advocates choose to stick to building affordable site-built 
housing. In some places, though, community advocates 
preach a message of higher-quality buildings, better 
financing, and more wealth building options. Their 
message is well received by the industry. Some states are 
proposing effective solutions, notably those which are 
already taking effect in New Hampshire and Vermont. 
There are beacons elsewhere, too, in places as diverse 
as Kentucky and California.
 Imagine what would happen if the supply of 
manufactured housing did not exist among our nation’s 
stock of homes.  At the end of the 1990s, manufactured 
housing accounted for 2 in every 10 new housing starts.9 
An estimated 8.7 million households,10  or more than 
18.3 million residents,11 lived in mobile homes in 2006. 
Without these homes, the crisis in affordable housing 
would be the most profound in the Southwest and 
Southeastern portion of the country. In 17 states, located 
mainly in these two regions, more than 10 percent of 
residents live in mobile homes.12  Rural areas, where a 
lack of market-driven development means that the stock 
of single-family residential stick-built homes is aging, 
would be particularly impacted.
 Even its ardent supporters admit that manufactured 
housing suffers from systemic problems. Financing 
costs, upon which much of this paper will focus, are 
generally higher. Those ﬁnancing problems are only the 
beginning. Building new projects requires advocates to 
surmount hurdles that are not present, or at least not as 
signiﬁcant, as those facing developers of single-family 
site-built home projects. Those problems include titling 
as personal property, zoning restrictions, and gaining 
access to land with viable infrastructure.
 Market-created manufactured housing has done 
much to account for the increase in homeownership rates. 
Mobile homes have been the fastest growing housing 
sector since World War II, increasing in number from 
just 315,000 in 1950 to almost nine million by 2000.13
Yet without systemic reform of the sector, the ﬁnancing 
for this housing may grow increasingly prohibitive. 
Advocates cannot ignore this need.
 Why do so many people choose manufactured 
housing? Perhaps it is because the prices are low. From 
1997 to 1999, manufactured housing accounted for 72 
percent of all new unsubsidized homes in a price range 
that was affordable to low-income buyers. Manufactured 
housing costs almost half as much, on a per square foot 
basis, as do site-built homes.14 From 1997 to 2001, 
the years in the Census Bureau’s most recent Resident 
Financial Survey, the median price of a manufactured 
home (both new and used) sold in the United States was 
$15,692. That eye-opening price is low for a number 
of reasons, speciﬁcally the inclusion of used homes in 
its calculation, the large share of homes that are sold in 
foreclosure or in distress sales, and the greater proportion 
of singlewides in existing stock.
 With such crucial affordability in mind, this 
paper will attempt to ascertain the truth in some of the 
perceptions that exist about manufactured housing, 
with a particular emphasis on the ﬁnancing barriers. To 
the extent that those perceptions hold back advocates 
from adopting this sector as a point of their efforts, 
they represent a discrete public policy obstacle. These 
perceptions are worth addressing for that reason. The 
most critical of these are that
• Borrowers are poor, white, and rural.
• It’s a Southern thing.
• Manufactured housing is relegated to the least 
desirable neighborhoods.
• “Lenders will ﬁnance anyone” or, alternatively, 
“No one can get a loan for manufactured 
housing.”
• Borrowers must go to captive financing 
companies because they are unable to access 
full service banks.
• Manufactured housing loans are difﬁcult to 
securitize. 
• All manufactured home loans bear expensive 
interest rates.
• These properties do not retain equity.
This paper will use one source of primary data, the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database, to test those 
perceptions.15 The data comes from mortgages made from 
2004 to 2006.  Some observations will be buttressed with 
data supplied by the US Census Bureau.
 The most signiﬁcant HMDA ﬁnding may be that 
the market varies widely throughout the country.  It turns 
out that getting a loan on your manufactured home has a 
lot to do with where the home is located. A reader may 
react to that statement with little surprise because it is a 
well-known verity that location matters when considering 
the value of a home. As such, realtors often ascribe to a 
mantra about location, location, location. In the case of 
manufactured housing, we know that putting a home on 
land impacts its wealth-building trajectory. 
 Location also appears to matter in a broader way. 
There is a great difference in regional markets across the 
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country. In the West, in the Mountain States, and in Puerto 
Rico, access to ﬁnancing is better than in the South and 
the Southwest.  Those differences include the amount of 
ﬁnancing available, the liquidity within the market, and 
the price associated with borrowing money. In these two 
regions, borrowers can access loans for higher amounts, 
relative to their income. Loans originated in these areas 
are more likely to be securitized, and they are less likely 
to bear a high-cost interest rate. 
 The differences surely reﬂect varieties in housing 
markets and in local regulations. Through the lens of 
HMDA, we can see the results that these contexts exert 
upon ﬁnancing. To say that the market works smoothly 
is wrong, but to say that it is entirely broken may be an 
overstatement. 
The First Myth: Borrowers are poor, white, and 
rural.
 Our numbers show that manufactured housing 
borrowers come from all levels of income. While they 
do tend to be white in greater proportions than the rest 
of the mortgage market, there is some variety in racial 
and ethnic background. In contrast to the expectations of 
the First Myth, most live in metropolitan areas, although 
that ﬁnding may reﬂect how demographers label areas. 
Incomes are generally lower than median.
 A discussion of the demographics of manufactured 
housing matters. Consider that many non-proﬁts deﬁne 
their mission based on service to people from certain 
areas (the Piedmont, inner-city Baltimore, or rural 
Appalachia, for example), from certain ethnic, racial, 
or religious backgrounds, or in certain income strata. 
To the extent that the perceived population of residents 
in manufactured housing is narrowly defined, that 
perception may serve to gently push some non-proﬁt 
groups away from manufactured housing because they 
do not realize that this housing type could be a viable 
path to homeownership for their constituents. 
 Loans to owner-occupied applicants show that the 
average borrower has a lower-than-average income. 
Still, borrowers are not destitute. The median income for 
owner-occupied manufactured housing loan originations 
was 79 percent of area median income. 
 From the perspective of the kinds of non-proﬁts and 
government housing agencies that attempt to increase 
the supply of housing available to low- and moderate–
income (LMI) populations, this ﬁnding about income is 
a virtue. It establishes the fact that manufactured housing 
purchases are indeed made by people well within the 
range of low- and moderate-income borrowers.  Then 
again, this ﬁnding conﬁrms existing expectations (as 
expressed by the First Myth), so merely knowing the 
relationship between LMI borrowers and manufactured 
housing is not enough to  justify its acceptance as an 
appropriate target for public investment.
 Borrowers are choosing higher-priced homes within 
the universe of mobile homes, as well.  The mean sales 
price of a manufactured home was just a bit over $23,900 
in 2001.16 That ﬁgure includes both singlewides and 
doublewides and both new and used homes. Compare 
those ﬁgures with data about sales of new homes. Figure 
1 shows mean sales prices for new manufactured homes 
for the last ten years.
Figure 1.  Sales of New Manufactured Homes, 1997-
2006
Year  Mean Price Singlewides Doublewides
1997 $39,800 $27,900 $48,100
1998 $41,600 $28,800 $49,800
1999 $43,300 $29,300 $51,100
2000 $46,400 $30,200 $53,600
2001 $48,900 $30,400 $55,200
2002 $51,300 $30,900 $56,100
2003 $54,900 $31,900 $59,700
2004 $58,200 $32,900 $63,400
2005 $62,600 $34,100 $68,700
2006 $64,200 $35,900 $71,400
Source: Census Bureau
Singlewides run in a general range from 900 to 1400 
square feet. Doublewides, as their name implies, are 
twice as large. For the price, this square footage should 
demonstrate the claims of affordability within the 
sector. 
 This table shows the price of doublewides have 
grown by a bit more than ﬁve percent per year, while 
the price of singlewides have increased by about three 
percent per year.  Over ten years, the discrepancy in 
average price has almost doubled.  In spite of that pricing 
differential, doublewides have increased their share of 
the overall market. Whereas in 1997, they accounted for 
59 percent of new ﬁnanced manufactured home sales, by 
2006, they made up almost 80 percent.
 As Figure 2 reﬂects, individuals seeking loans 
for manufactured housing are concentrated within 
white Caucasian families. At the same time, as many 
as twenty percent of borrowers are either non-white or 
have not identiﬁed their racial status. This table provides 
descriptive statistics to characterize the assertion that 
borrowers are mainly white and rural.  It appears that 
fewer African-American and Asian borrowers are seeking 
loans on manufactured housing. However, the number 
of white and Latino borrowers is increasing. 
 The HMDA data reports that a majority of borrowers 
are from urban areas, however. Urban areas include any 
loan made in a metropolitan area. But other data sets, such 
as the American Community Survey, often suggest that 
manufactured housing is rural. A recent study explains 
the contradiction – most manufactured housing is either 
suburban or exurban  and can therefore fall into either 
classiﬁcation depending on the data set’s deﬁnition of 
urban.17
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The Second Myth: It’s a Southern Thing. 
 Taken to an extreme, manufactured housing has 
attained an iconic place in a narrative about the South. 
 The same power of perception that held to our 
analysis of the ﬁrst myth matters here as well. Housing 
preferences vary dramatically, not just in terms of 
neighborhood type, but also among regions of the 
country. Many parts of the South are unincorporated. That 
fact alone makes a difference because it predetermines 
the choices in infrastructure. There are also issues related 
to cultural preference. Developers desire to provide 
culturally desirable housing, if only because it makes 
good business sense. No one wants to build lofts along 
the border of Texas and Mexico, just as the concrete and 
corrugated metal colonias would not ﬁt within the woods 
of Vermont.  If a sense exists that manufactured housing 
is only sought after by dwellers in one part of the country, 
then this will likely thwart its adaptation elsewhere.
 Certainly the numbers show that people all over 
the country, allowing for some variation in passion, 
feel compelled to take advantage of the possibilities 
in manufactured housing. Any manufacturer of mobile 
homes would quickly balk at the notion that their 
products only work in one region of the country.  At 
Palm Harbor Homes, for example, the three leading states 
receiving shipments of homes are California, Arizona, 
and Florida.18  While manufactured housing is very 
popular throughout the South, it also serves many in the 
West, in the Midwest, and in parts of the Southwest. It 
is less prevalent in the upper Midwest, in the Northeast, 
and in the Mid-Atlantic regions.
 Beyond the distribution, regional markets vary 
in their ﬁnancing and loan sizes. In eight states, the 
frequency of high cost  lending for loans on manufactured 
homes were lower than they were for loan applications 
on owner-occupied single-family housing in 2006. Those 
states are all in the Northeast or the West. 
 This is a surprising variation. More research should 
consider what makes the outcomes of ﬁnancing in these 
states so different. One possibility is that the ﬁndings 
reﬂect the response of underwriters to differences in the 
collateral value of land. In HMDA, manufactured housing 
loan records can reﬂect either personal property loans or 
land-home packages with full real property status. With 
increasing frequency, manufactured housing is sold in 
the land-home package. Homes, of course, are made up 
of both land and a building. The land goes up in value 
while the building generally depreciates. The same is true 
for manufactured housing, in a very general sense. The 
value of land could even change the cost of lending for 
personal property mortgages in instances where renters 
have a long-term lease in an area with few alternatives 
for better housing values. 
 Unfortunately, more manufactured housing is being 
purchased in the high-cost loan areas than in the low-
cost regions. The next table tracks the interest price and 
volume of manufactured housing originations.
 When considering all property types as a whole, the 
Southeast is the region with the lowest average interest 
rate.19  The Rust Belt is the highest. This contradicts the 
geographic variations in the price of interest rates among 
the larger body of manufactured housing loans.
 This infers a more complicated truth than was 
originally suggested by the myth.  Lenders will make 
2004 2005 2006 Sum Share Change
Race and Ethnicity
   Asian 858 753 839 2,450 0.5% -2.2%
Black 7,575 6,575 6,981 21,131 4.7% -7.8%
   Islander 274 271 278 823 0.2% 1.5%
   Latino 10,508 10,773 11,831 33,112 7.4% 12.6%
   Native American 1,270 1,174 1,379 3,823 0.9% 8.6%
   Not Provided 8,536 7,986 11,188 27,710 6.2% 31.1%
   White 112,159 116,224 126,377 354,760 79.3% 12.7%
   Not Given 9,716 9,121 12,513 31,350 7.0% 28.8%
Geography
   Rural 54,794 54,672 67,451 176,917 39.5% 23.1%
   Urban 87,566 90,219 92,747 270,532 60.5% 5.9%
Total 142,360 144,891 160,198 447,449 100.0% 12.5%
Figure 2.  Home purchase loans, 2004-2006
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loans on manufactured housing.  Nonetheless, they 
generally charge high rates of interest. These ﬁndings 
may show that lenders are relatively comfortable lending 
to borrowers that collateralize their borrowings with 
instruments whose values stem in greater part from 
land. 
 The loan amounts are dramatically different, as well. 
In the South, home purchase loans averaged $60,777 
over the last three years. In the West, by contrast, home 
purchase loan amounts averaged $117,124.  
 While the frequency of high-cost loans is roughly 
the same for home rehabilitation, reﬁnance, or home 
purchase loans, the variation in the incidence of high-
cost loans is greatest among the purchases. In Nevada 
(16.7 percent), Washington (17.7 percent), Idaho (18.2 
percent), and Puerto Rico (3.4 percent), fewer than one 
in ﬁve home purchase loans is high-cost. 
The Third Myth: Manufactured housing 
is relegated to the worst locations. You can find 
manufac tured  homes 
only in the least desirable 
neighborhoods. 
 T h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s 
important for a number of 
reasons.  First, because it 
interacts with the powerful 
voices of “not-in-my-back-
yard” (NIMBY), notions 
about housing type among 
planners often conspire to 
inﬂuence zoning decisions. 
There is some empirical 
evidence to back up these 
voices: research in North 
Carolina found that property 
Manufactured Homes Single Family Stick Built
Volume High Cost Volume High Cost
Percent 
Difference
Utah 857 157 41,593 8,036 -1.0%
Indiana 3,090 906 58,325 17,750 -1.1%
Arizona 6,835 1,941 111,104 34,306 -2.5%
Florida 15,281 5,600 280,847 111,080 -2.9%
Idaho 1,228 223 18,566 3,980 -3.3%
Washington 5,949 1,070 72,541 17,080 -5.6%
Rhode Island 79 21 6,702 2,444 -9.9%
Nevada 2,115 367 54,208 16,512 -13.1%
Washington, DC 9 - 4,530 1,313 -29.0%
Only includes ﬁrst lien purchase loans, 2006
Figure 3.  Quantity and Cost of Mortgages in Eight appreciation increased 
more  when homes 
were located farther 
from manufactured 
h o u s i n g . 2 0 A t  t h e 
same time, planners 
who cede to these 
voices will potentially 
consign manufactured 
housing to second-best 
locations. Those are 
often ones with inferior 
access to infrastructure, 
transportation, services, 
and employment. 
 Neighborhood quality 
is one of the deﬁning 
cha rac te r i s t i c s  o f 
housing. It would be an 
unfortunate tradeoff, 
in the minds of most housing advocates, if efforts to 
increase homeownership compelled residents to move 
to lower-quality neighborhoods.  Yet this is clearly a 
distinct possibility.  Potentially, that could mean that low 
and middle income (LMI) housing purchase programs 
funnel the poor into neighborhoods with fewer amenities 
(parks, good schools, services, jobs), greater expenses for 
commuting, and more exposure to disamenities (crime, 
pollution, trafﬁc, et al). Research that has addressed 
this question ﬁnds that LMI minorities experienced the 
greatest gains in neighborhood quality made by ﬁrst time 
homeowners.21
 There is not any data on the quality of neighborhoods 
in HMDA records. Still, HMDA data does tell us 
the median income in a census tract where a loan is 
originated. It includes statistics on the relative difference 
in the income of that neighborhood compared to the 
income of the surrounding metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA). 
 If we can impute that a higher than median income 
census tract is an approximation for a good neighborhood, 
High Cost Not High Cost Total Percent High Cost
Mid Atlantic 940 1,668 2,608 36.0%
Midwest 36,203 45,010 81,213 44.6%
Northeast 11,557 18,169 29,726 38.9%
South 84,559 92,922 177,481 47.6%
Southwest 28,737 34,638 63,375 45.3%
West 22,818 49,935 72,753 31.4%
Total 192,449 248,977 441,426 43.6%
First lien home purchases, 2004 to 2006     
Figure 4.  Financing Costs by Region
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than we can make some descriptive statements about 
neighborhood quality. I would argue that this is a fair 
assumption. The market is, if nothing else, an excellent 
diviner of value. All things being equal, more desirable 
residential locations should have higher priced homes and 
relatively higher income families inside their environs. 
What does the analysis suggest about the relationship 
between location of manufactured housing and 
neighborhood quality? The answer is that manufactured 
housing appears to be located in neighborhoods across 
the income spectrum. In the 649,401 originations from 
2004 to 2006 that come with neighborhood income data, 
only about 16.8 percent were originated in census tracts 
with median household incomes at less than 80 percent 
of the MSA median. Approximately two in seven were 
originated in moderate income (from 80 percent to 100 
percent) census tracts, however. Surprisingly, a fair 
amount of loans were for manufactured homes sited in 
the best neighborhoods. More than 11 percent, or about 
72,292, were originated for homes in upper income 
census tracts.
 Regional differences also weigh heavily in 
neighborhood locations for manufactured housing. The 
biggest regional differences are once again between 
the South and the West. The differences can be seen at 
both the upper and the lower ends of our indicators for 
neighborhood income. Loans in the South are much 
more likely to go to a home in a low-or moderate-income 
census tract compared to loans for a manufactured home 
in the West. They are also much less likely to go to a 
home in an upper-income census tract.  
 This finding should undermine the notion that 
manufactured housing is always in the worst location. It 
should also assuage fears that relying upon manufactured 
housing as the housing type of choice in some form of 
public investment scheme would  relegate aid recipients 
to substandard housing locations.
The Fourth Myth: Lenders will ﬁnance anyone. Or, 
alternatively, No one can get a loan for manufactured 
housing.
 These two myths appear to contradict each other. 
Nonetheless, some people subscribe to each viewpoint. 
Taken together, it means there is a lot of confusion about 
the availability of ﬁnancing for manufactured housing. 
This may be a direct product of the murky system that 
surrounds lending in this sector. For years, people 
ﬁnanced a mobile home with the same person who sold 
them their home. There was no ﬁxed price on mobile 
homes, and ﬁnancing was coupled with the sale. These 
memories support the ﬁrst assumption.
 On the other hand, a close look at the sector reveals 
that widespread changes have occurred since 2000. 
Signiﬁcantly, some of the largest lenders and servicers 
of mobile home ﬁnancing (entities like Greentree and 
Conseco) went bankrupt. No one stepped into the market 
to take their place.  Additionally, manufactured housing 
producer Fleetwood closed down its lending operation. 
But originations have actually increased in both 2005 
and 2006 over previous years. Declination rates dropped 
eight percentage points in 2006 to just over 42 percent. 
 Another point to consider is that lenders are most 
likely to ﬁnance borrowers whose risk is mitigated by 
government participation in the loan. Borrowers are 
almost twice as likely to be approved for an FHA loan 
(1.91 times) on manufactured housing than they are to 
be approved for a conventional loan, and more than four 
times as likely when the loan is through either the VA or 
the FSA. An upper income borrower is still much more 
likely (3.36 times more likely) to be turned down for 
a conventional loan to purchase a home than is a low-
income borrower who uses the VA program. 
 The type of loan and the purpose of the loan 
should be a strong factor in the availability of ﬁnancing. 
Conventional home purchase loans were denied at a rate 
1.91 times greater than loans in government programs 
(FHA, VA, FSA, RHS). 
 The difﬁculty in getting access to credit may have 
less to do with the type of housing utilized for collateral 
than with the type of borrower applying for a loan. At 
their own volition, ﬁnancial institutions can attribute an 
explanation for a denial of credit in HMDA data. In the 
946,380 instances when they did turn down a loan from 
2004 to 2006, borrower credit was cited 27.6 percent 
of the time as the reason for the denial. Collateral, by 
comparison, was given as the explaining factor only 6.1 
Figure 5.  Manufactured Housing Shipments, 
1959-2006
Reﬂects seasonally unadjusted data.
Source: US Census Bureau: US Shipments of New Manufac-
tured Homes, Manufactured Housing Institute (1959-1977), 
Institute for Building Technology and Safety (1978-2006)
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percent of the time, meaning that borrower credit is the 
basis for credit denial 4.3 times as often as insufﬁcient 
collateral. In the case of home purchase applications for 
conventional loans, the difference was one of 11.1 times 
in magnitude. Credit was the leading cause of declination. 
Collateral was third, with borrower’s debt-to-income 
ratio cited only slightly more frequently.
 In the West, borrowers are able to get home purchase 
loans on much higher amounts relative to their income. 
More than one in four home purchase originations in each 
of these areas goes for an amount that is more than three 
times the annual income of the individual applying for 
the loan. By contrast, only about nine percent of home 
purchase loans originated in the South and Southwestern 
states allow borrowers to ﬁnance that much relative to 
their incomes. Most borrow far less. In fact, more than 
57 and 58 percent, respectively, borrow less than 150 
percent of their annual income when they buy a home 
in those regions.
 Some would say that the terms of credit and access 
to ﬁnancing are expressions of the alternative system of 
credit that surrounds manufactured housing. This is a 
worthy assumption since manufactured housing ﬁnancing 
developed within the framework of selling homes off a 
lot. The dealer holds a great deal of control within the 
market over both manufacturers and buyers.
The Fifth Myth: Because full service banks avoid 
the market, borrowers must go to captive ﬁnancing 
companies, the kind linked to a manufacturer or a 
dealer. 
 This is not true.  Banks and credit unions make loans 
on manufactured housing. In fact, Wells Fargo is the 
leading manufactured housing lender, by volume over the 
last three years, of all ﬁnancial institutions. They are not 
a captive ﬁnancing arm of a leading manufacturer. The 
top ten lenders, who together comprised 28 percent of all 
loans between 2004 and 2006, include just two ﬁnancial 
subsidiaries: Vanderbilt (of Clayton, a manufactured 
home producer) and 21st Century Mortgage. 
 In the last few years, the mortgage operations of 
several manufacturers have closed. Fleetwood shuttered 
its lending unit in 2006. Champion provides short-term 
ﬁnancing to dealers that carry its homes on their lots, but 
it does not make loans to consumers.  Palm Harbor and 
Clayton, on the other hand, continue to provide loans. 
 Nevertheless, manufacturers approach ﬁnancing 
with hesitation. The crisis that hit manufactured housing 
lending from the late 1990s through 2001 was a product of 
“loose credit standards for home-only loans,” according 
to one manufacturer.22   The subsequent reaction has 
directly impacted sales volumes. Judging by the rate of 
declinations, credit is tight for loan applicants who want 
to buy manufactured homes.  
 One group of borrowers—the one deﬁned by those 
seeking a chattel loan—is disproportionately more likely 
to get a loan from the dealer.  Chattel loans are ones 
made on personal property.  Generally, that means homes 
not ﬁxed to the ground by a permanent foundation. In 
practice, this is a pejorative description for loans with bad 
terms such as high interest rates, balloon payments, and 
predatory features. Getting a loan for a home classiﬁed 
as personal property from a bank is relatively difﬁcult 
because of the lack of GSE demand (government-
sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
the twelve Federal HOME loan banks) for those loans on 
the secondary market.  A greater percentage of personal 
property loans are made through consumer ﬁnance and 
dealers ﬁnancing companies.23 
The Sixth Myth: Manufactured housing loans are 
difﬁcult to securitize. 
 The underlying assumption of this statement is 
that lenders resist making these loans, in part because 
the lack of a secondary market poses a threat to lender’s 
liquidity. Yet the statement is not entirely true. There is a 
ﬂourishing secondary market for mortgages in the FHA, 
VA, and FSA programs. In the last three years, more than 
80 percent of mortgages in each of those programs were 
sold on the secondary market. 
 The secondary market treats conventional loans 
differently, however. Many were made into asset and 
mortgage-backed securities. Of the ones that were 
securitized (about 26 percent), slightly more than half 
had a high cost interest rate. The conventional market is 
big, though. It accounts for slightly more than 85 percent 
of all originations. 
 Within the conventional market, about fourteen 
percent of loans by volume are extended to LMI 
borrowers. A greater percentage (about 39 percent) of 
loans go to borrowers in LMI tracts. 
 This secondary market for conventional manufactured 
housing loans has become relatively oligopsonistic. Five 
out of six manufactured housing loans are purchased by 
just ten lenders. Such an arrangement suggests that the 
buyers have a lot of market power over the lenders who 
originate loans on manufactured housing. 
 In many ways, it is a case of layers of government 
intervention supporting some loans, but very little 
government intervention supporting others. More than 
73 percent of all FHA, VA, FSA, and RHS manufactured 
housing loans that are purchased on the secondary market 
are bought by Ginnie Mae. 
 Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, by purchasing 
mortgages from originators, provide liquidity for lenders. 
But they buy manufactured housing loans in limited 
circumstances. 
 What kind of manufactured housing loans are they 
buying? Figure 6 suggests that while terms vary, one 
thing they have in common is that they will only consider 
real property loans. As a result, approximately 92 and 96 
percent of loans acquired by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
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Mac, respectively, bear low cost interest rates.
 Even so, Fannie and Freddie’s involvement is 
limited and only provides securitization to slightly less 
than one in every eight manufactured housing loans 
originated in the United States (11.96 percent). Because 
the rest of the buyers tend to avoid conventional loans, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac account for almost half 
(45.3 percent) of the securitizations for conventional 
loans. 
 These government sponsored loans are also more 
likely to be priced at a prime price. It is hard to say if 
the liquidity creates the pricing, or if the pricing leads to 
the liquidity. Nevertheless, there is a dramatic difference 
between the interest rates on GSE loans and those in the 
rest of market. From 2004 to 2006, less than 6 percent 
of these loans bore a high cost interest rate.
 Demand for loans on the secondary market dropped 
off in 2006. Figure 7 shows securitizations reported in 
HMDA data for each of the three years 2004 to 2006. 
All loan types are included. 
   The markets most affected are the ones for 
conventional loans in the Midwest, the South, and the 
Southwest. Purchases for those loans fell off by 93 
percent from 2004 to 2006. Of the ten states where 
Fannie and Freddie had the smallest market share in 
2006, all but Georgia and Louisiana are in the Northeast. 
By contrast, the states where Fannie and Freddie had the 
highest market share in 2006 were all west of Wyoming, 
with the exception of the District of Columbia. Figure 
8 shows the variation in eventual securitization of loans 
originated on manufactured housing in 2006.  Notice how 
the private market’s interest in buying loans corresponds 
to the interest exhibited by the GSEs. The GSEs focus 
their purchases on non-high-cost loans. In 2006, for 
example, only 7.4 percent of loans purchased by one of 
the four GSEs were high cost. The GSEs bought more 
than 55 percent of all 
high-cost loans that 
were securitized in 
2006.
 W h o  b u y s 
high-cost debt? The 
answer is that as 
there is little liquidity 
for those loans, more 
than 87 percent of 
all high-cost loans 
are not purchased 
at all .  Insurance 
companies ,  who 
use the cash flows 
from these loans to 
provide revenue, are 
more willing to take 
on the risk inherent 
in high-cost loans. 
In 2006, they bought 4,960 high-cost loans – about 36 
percent of all high-cost loans that were successfully 
securitized.25 
The Seventh Myth: All loans are high cost.
 One of the chief obstacles to integrating manufactured 
housing within the range of suitable products for 
community development is the perception of its cost 
of financing. Nonprofit advocates contend that any 
development with manufactured housing would fail to 
build wealth for its clients because they would inevitably 
take out bad loans. This is closely linked to another 
perception—that manufactured housing depreciates in 
value. We cannot ascertain the truth of the latter statement 
with HMDA data. Nonetheless, HMDA does provide an 
excellent vantage point for assessing the primary claim 
that all manufactured housing lending is high cost.
 The ﬁndings suggest that the answer is not that 
simple. About half of all conventional (50.2 percent) 
manufactured housing loans bear high interest rates. 
• Conventional owner-occupant loans are more 
likely to bear a high-cost interest rate (frequency 
equals 52.1 percent) compared to conventional 
non-owner-occupied originations (frequency equals 
35.1 percent). 
• Only 6.7 percent of FHA loans bear a high-cost 
rate. The beneﬁts of FHA mortgages are enjoyed 
by owner-occupants. Over 99.4 percent of all FHA 
originations are owner-occupied. These mortgages 
come with a down-payment requirement.
There are a lot of very bad loans made on manufactured 
housing. Deﬁning a bad loan is difﬁcult, but there is one 
agreed upon benchmark – the HOEPA label. The Home 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994 
Freddie Mac Fannie Mae
Term 15, 20 and 30 10, 15, 20, and 30 year
ARMs Yes: 7/1, 10/1 Yes
Fixed-rate Yes Yes
Personal Property No No
Pre-HUD Code No No
Cash-out Reﬁnance Yes Yes, up to 20-year-term at 65% LTV
Max LTV 95% 95%
Loan Type Conventional Conventional, FHA (both ﬁxed and ARM)
Appraisal Required Required
Lien First lien First lien
Fee for Buying MH debt 50 basis points 50 basis points
Figure 6.  Mortgage Terms of Leading Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs)
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established a system for safeguards on loans that would 
otherwise hold the greatest potential for stripping wealth 
from borrowers. The act constrains lenders from freely 
originating these loans by requiring extra disclosures and 
additional strictures. HOEPA loans are generally very 
high cost, with prices that are more than 800 basis points 
above comparably termed Treasury securities. 
 There were 8,252 HOEPA loans made on 
manufactured housing from 2004 to 2006. That is 
approximately one percent of all originations. The 
average interest rate for loans in this group exceeded 
comparably termed Treasuries by 982 basis points.
 Although earlier mentioned differences in interest 
rate cost among regions would lead us to suspect to ﬁnd 
this in the South and Southwest, HOEPA loans are more 
often situated elsewhere. The problem is largely conﬁned 
to states in the Midwest, where just slightly less than 
one in forty originations (2.18 percent) is identiﬁed as 
a HOEPA loan. An origination in the Midwest is 2.76 
times more likely to be rated as a HOEPA loan than are 
loans in the rest of the country. It is a rate that outpaces 
the West by four times and is even double the rate within 
the Southern United States. Almost one in eight of all 
manufactured housing HOEPA loans originated in the 
United States was made to a borrower from Michigan. 
None of these HOEPA loans went for home purchase 
loans. All were conﬁned to either reﬁnance or home 
rehabilitation loans. More than 4 percent (4.2) of loans 
made for home rehab on a manufactured home were 
identiﬁed as HOEPA loans. More than 11 percent of 
rehab loans in Alabama and 20.4 percent in Michigan 
were HOEPA. 
The Eighth Myth:  Manufactured homes do not retain 
equity.  
 This myth may be the most problematic of all, as it 
is leveled as a critique that keeps nonproﬁts and public 
investment out of this sector.  If it is true, their reluctance 
is warranted, and advocating for this sector would be a 
second-best path to homeownership.  Furthermore, many 
policy decisions hang on a subscription to this belief, so it 
deserves close scrutiny through the following questions: 
Does manufactured housing retain its equity?  If so, under 
what conditions?  What are the implications for home 
reﬁnance, repair, and wealth building strategies?
 This myth impacts the ability of borrowers to get 
loans on used homes. Homes will not retain equity 
unless demand exists to buy them, and one of the 
biggest problems with the market for making loans on 
manufactured housing is the trouble with reselling a 
manufactured home.  But that demand is also a product 
of the availability of loans to buy used homes.  The same 
forces dictate the likelihood that lenders will be willing 
to lend for repairs on used homes.25 
 This question addresses not just our immediate 
concerns about availability of capital for these ﬁnance 
products; it goes further. It lets us gauge the relative 
truth of one of the lasting critiques about manufactured 
housing. It is said that manufactured housing “does not 
retain equity,” and this is a widely held perception. It 
has also become a critique that many see as necessary 
to resolve before public investment can be directed into 
this sector. 
 The equity problem stems from the large role 
that dealers play in providing ﬁnancing on the sale of 
manufactured homes. While borrowers can get credit 
to buy a new home on a lot, can they also get credit to 
reﬁnance their home once it has been sited on a lot? 
HMDA data is not detailed enough to 
give us a full picture, but it does show 
clearly that reﬁnancing mobile homes is 
a possibility.  
      In a curious development, reﬁnance 
loans have become an entry point for 
some cautious lenders. For a lender, 
participating in refinance mortgages 
represents an opportunity that avoids 
much of the assumed downward trajectory 
in price. One credit union in North 
Carolina will not provide home purchase 
loans but will make reﬁnance loans on real 
property homes that are at least one year old. This means 
that homes can be underwritten at loan-to-value ratios 
that capture the “off-the-lot” depreciation problem. 
 With that on-the-ground context, the loan sizes on 
reﬁnance loans tell us a very optimistic story. While the 
mean loan size for a home purchase was approximately 
$70,349 from 2004 to 2006, the mean loan size on a 
reﬁnance was higher. Reﬁnances averaged $77,639. 
Prices had a lower than average bias, but median 
reﬁnances were still $69,000 compared to a median of 
just $59,000 for home purchases. 
 People do not just need capital to buy homes. They 
also need to be able to access credit to improve their 
homes. Moreover, the ability of borrowers to continue 
to draw ﬁnancing on their used homes tells us something 
about their performance in the market place. Borrowers 
made 62,783 home rehabilitation loans on manufactured 
homes in the three year period from 2004 to 2006. Each 
Loan Type 2004 2005 2006
Percent Change 
since 2004
Conventional 130,359 98,064 12,348 -90.5%
FHA 13,656 15,377 11,696 -14.4%
FSA or RHS 63 31 14 -77.8%
VA 1,634 1,831 1,013 -38.0%
Total 145,712 115,303 25,071 -82.8%
Figure 7.  Securitizations Reported in HMDA Data, 2004-2006
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subsequent year witnessed a slight uptick in the number 
of loans. Almost all rehab loans were conventional 
mortgages. The median loan size was $23,000.
 North Carolina is one of many states with a housing 
ﬁnance agency that will not provide loans for residents in 
manufactured housing to rehabilitate their properties. 
In general, it appears that ﬁnancing is available for 
borrowers to ﬁx up their manufactured homes from 
private lenders, but the loans for that opportunity come 
with the most onerous interest rates. Home rehab loans 
are the most likely to be labeled by the Federal Trade 
Commission as HOEPA loans and thus require the 
additional levels of regulation associated with those 
loans. 
 Geography plays a part too. Getting a loan to ﬁx 
up your home is more difﬁcult in the South and the 
Southwest. The same regional disparity that exists in 
the cost of lending also emerges here in terms of access 
to ﬁnancing for home rehabilitation. Of the 27 states 
where home rehab loans made up a greater share of all 
owner-occupied loans than the mean (8.4 percent), only 
ﬁve were from the South or Southwest. None of the 
Southern or Southwestern states ranked in the top ten 
states in terms of market share made up by home rehab 
loans. 
 Home rehab loans defy one of the expectations for 
the larger real estate market in that owner-occupants 
normally pay a higher interest rate for these loans than 
do non-owner occupants. Almost two of every three 
home rehab loans in a ﬁrst lien position had a high-cost 
interest rate from 2004 to 2006 (63.4 percent), whereas 
just 46.1 percent of similar loans taken out by non-owner 
occupants had a high-cost interest rate. When they do 
get a high-cost loan, irrespective of lien position, owner-
occupants paid an interest rate that was, on average, about 
61 basis points higher than non-owner occupants paid on 
their high cost loans. 
 Some types of loans are especially hard to securitize. 
Loans to rehabilitate manufactured housing ﬁnd little 
demand on the secondary market. Less than one in ten 
(9.51 percent) are securitized. Freddie Mac and Fannie 
and Ginnie Mae together only purchased 1,169 rehab 
loans in those three years. 
 The larger lesson about loans for reﬁnance or repair 
muddies the absolute nature of the commonly held belief 
that manufactured homes do not retain value. It appears 
that they can continue to be viable as collateral after their 
original sale. 
    Left unsaid 
in the equity-
d e p l e t i n g 
argument is a 
candid  t ru th 
a b o u t  t h e 
ﬁnancial returns 
o f  s i t e -bu i l t 
housing. While it is true that owning a home presents a 
family with a great opportunity to build wealth, a more 
exact statement would be that owning land confers the 
chance to reap ﬁnancial gains. Land goes up in value, 
but in most cases, the structure of the house increases 
little. The structure also imposes maintenance costs. It is 
unfair to compare a landless mobile home with a stick-
built home and land. 
 Policy makers and advocates alike should seek to 
introduce manufactured housing into ownership systems 
that give low-income residents the beneﬁts of land. The 
“land-home package,” through fee simple ownership, is 
the simplest and most common example. Other less well-
known opportunities also exist. Housing cooperatives 
and non-proﬁt ownership are two examples which have 
only begun to be explored. 
 Certainly, community development lenders that 
gingerly limit their lending to reﬁnances on used homes 
may ultimately protect their interests. Manufactured 
housing, at worse, compares to other investments that 
lose value slowly. 
Conclusion
 Policy makers working in areas that affect 
manufactured housing must recognize the continued 
persistence of problems in the market. Included here 
are non-proﬁt developers, but also bank underwriters, 
land-use planners, and state housing ﬁnance agencies. 
All of these groups, which can promote or hinder the 
momentum of this sector, should see that their actions can 
afﬁrm the potential of manufactured housing as a point 
of access for wealth building for low-income people.
 Clearly there is great variety among states and 
regions in the United States in terms of the type of 
ﬁnancing issued for borrowers. Borrowers in the West 
and in the Northeast are really not under the same onerous 
forces that exist and undermine borrowers in the South 
and Southwest. The market itself is functioning well. 
 Those outcomes are likely a product not just 
of factors within “the market,” such as demand for 
alternative types of housing, the price of land, and the 
health of the economy, but also of the variety of legal 
frameworks that surround manufactured housing. Some 
states will confer real property status upon manufactured 
housing more willingly than others. For example, in 
California, manufactured home owners in land-lease 
parks can get real property loans on homes with long-
Region Private Share Government Share Not Securitized
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic 10.9% 8.2% 80.9%
Midwest 11.6% 15.5% 72.9%
West 28.5% 23.1% 48.3%
South 11.3% 14.1% 74.6%
Figure 8.  Securitization of Loans for Manufactured Housing, 2006
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term leases. AARP and the National Consumer Law 
Center have put together a survey of laws governing 
residents in manufactured housing parks. Laws such as 
right-of-ﬁrst refusal, when coupled with frameworks 
that give residents access to ﬁnancing to buy parks, can 
make a big difference in security for people who live in 
manufactured housing communities. 
 This paper proposes a new direction for non-proﬁts. 
The time is right to consider a policy of “engagement” 
with manufactured housing and with segments of the 
industry itself. The underlying features of low-cost 
housing built on dense lots, both in inﬁll settings and 
in traditional parks, have retained if not increased their 
popularity. The underlying fundamental quality of the 
housing structure itself has improved. Good relationships 
can be developed with manufacturers.
 Many problems exist, as outlined in here. Yet 
all too often, those problems are circumstantial to the 
manufactured housing product itself.  Financing, zoning, 
and statutes deﬁning real property emerge as turning 
points where opportunities will be created. 
 The institutional answers to shepherd a new 
direction are just now being created. They include not 
just cooperative and non-proﬁt ownership, but also fee 
simple housing arrangements. The existing framework of 
actors that make affordable housing production possible 
in the United States (state housing ﬁnance agencies, the 
GSEs, non-proﬁt developers, and tax credit-incentivized 
ﬁnancial institutions) can extend their missions to include 
the housing needs of manufactured housing residents.
 Although the industry will not welcome the 
medicine of engagement, it may beneﬁt greatly from the 
cure.  Manufactured housing witnessed a renaissance 
in sales volume 30 years ago following the development 
of HUD-code standards. In a new era, with advocate 
engagement, demand for affordable housing can be met 
with manufactured homes. 
Endnotes
1 Retsinas, Nicolas and Eric Belsky.  2002. 
“Examining the Unexamined Goal.” In Low-Income 
Homeownership: Examining The Unexamined Goal. 
Ed. by Nicolas Retsinas and Eric Belsky.  Brookings 
Institution Press and Joint Center for Housing Studies 
at Harvard University. 1-14 
2 Genz, Richard. 2001. “Why Advocates Need to 
Rethink Manufactured Housing.” Housing Policy 
Debate. Vol. 12(2):393-414
3 US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
and the US Census Bureau. 2001. Residential Finance 
Survey. Table 9-1: Mortgage Status, Mobile Home 
Properties
4 US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
and the US Census Bureau. 2001. Residential Finance 
Survey. Table 9-1: Mortgage Status, Mobile Home 
Properties
5 Beamish, Julia O., Rosemary Goss,  Jorge Atiles, 
and Youngjoo Kim.  2001.  “Not a Trailer Anymore: 
Perceptions of Manufactured Housing.” Housing 
Policy Debate.  Vol. 12(2):373-392. Fannie Mae 
Foundation
6 Collins, Michael. 2001.  “Manufacturing 
Affordability.” Bright Ideas.  Summer.  64-5
7 Wubneh, M., Shen. G.  2004.  “The Impact of 
Manufactured Housing on Adjacent Residential 
Property Values: A GIS Approach Based on Three 
North Carolina Counties.” Review of Urban & 
Regional Development Studies. 16(1):56-73
8 Champion Enterprises. Form 10-K Fiscal Year End 
December 30,2006. Auburn Hills, Michigan. 
9 Owens, Joseph. 1996.  “Who’s Buying Manufactured 
Homes?” Urban Land 55(1):21-3
10 Beamish, Julia O., Rosemary Goss,  Jorge Atiles, 
and Youngjoo Kim.  2001.  “Not a Trailer Anymore: 
Perceptions of Manufactured Housing.” Housing 
Policy Debate.  Vol. 12(2):373-392. Fannie Mae 
Foundation
11 US Census Bureau, 2006 American Community 
Survey. B25024. Units in Structure – Universe: 
Housing Units
12 US Census Bureau, 2006 American Community 
Survey. B25033. Total Population in Occupied 
Housing Units by Tenure of Units in Structure – 
Universe: Total Population in Occupied Housing Units
13 US Census Bureau, 2004 American Community 
Survey. R2501. Percent of Housing Units that Are 
Mobile Homes: 2004 Universe: Total Housing Units.
14 Benneﬁeld, Robert and Robert Bonnette. 2003. 
Structural and Occupancy Characteristics of Housing: 
2000. Census 2000 Brief c2kbr-32. US Census Bureau
15 It is important to note that only a portion of 
manufactured homes are acquired with ﬁnancing 
of any kind. From 1997 to 2001, about 1.2 million 
mobile homes changed hands. During that time, only 
293,000 of those properties were purchased with debt. 
A small percentage of the homes were converted from 
nonresidential use, but many others were transferred 
for cash. US Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and the US Census Bureau. 2001. 
Residential Finance Survey. Table 9-1: Mortgage 
Status, Mobile Home Properties
16 US Department of Housing and Urban Development 
and the US Census Bureau. 2001. Residential Finance 
Survey. Table 9-1: Mortgage Status, Mobile Home 
Properties
17 Carter, C., O. Williamson, E. DeArmond, and J. 
Sheldon. 2004. “Manufactured Housing Community 
Tenants: Shifting the Balance of Power. A Model 
State Statute.” Revised Edition. AARP Public Policy 
Institute. Washington, DC.
18 Palm Harbor Homes.  Securities and Exchange 
24 Rust
Commission Form EX.99-1. “Palm Harbor Homes, 
Inc. reports Third Quarter Fiscal 2008 Results.”  Jan. 
22, 2008.  http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/923473/0
00119312508009774/dex991.htm
19 This paper adopts the deﬁnition of high cost loans 
utilized within the HMDA LAR format. The FFIEC 
provides a discrete basis point description of the 
price premium on all loans priced at or above 300 
basis points over comparable term treasury notes for 
ﬁrst lien position loans and 500 basis points over 
comparably termed Treasury notes for second lien 
position loans. When a loan is above those thresholds, 
HMDA reports the interest rate premium to the single 
basis point. It is not exactly accurate to use high cost 
and subprime interchangeably. High cost loans often 
cost more than subprime loans. 
20 Avery, Robert, K. Brevoort, and G. Canner. “Higher 
Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data. 
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Sept. 18, 2006 
21 Wubneh, M., Shen. G.  2004.  “The Impact of 
Manufactured Housing on Adjacent Residential 
Property Values: A GIS Approach Based on Three 
North Carolina Counties.” Review of Urban & 
Regional Development Studies. 16(1):56-73
22 Reid, Carolina.  2004.  “Achieving the 
American Dream? A Longitudinal Analysis of 
the Homeownership Experiences of Low-Income 
Households.” Dissertation Discussion Paper.  
University of Wisconsin 
23 Champion Corporation. Securities and Exchange 
Commission Form 10-k. 2006
24 Strauss, Leslie R. 1998. “Credit and Capital Needs 
for Affordable Rural Housing,” in
Housing in Rural America: Building Affordable and 
Inclusive Communities, Joseph N.
Belden and Robert J. Wiener, eds. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications, 125–136
25 There are some data constraints in our ability 
to determine the cost of obtaining loans on used 
manufactured homes. We do not see the age of homes 
in HMDA data. We do know that both reﬁnance and 
home rehabilitation loans are made exclusively for 
used homes. 
September 24-26, 2008
Raleigh Convention Center (set to open September 2008)
Keynote Speaker:  Timothy Beatley, Teresa Heinz Professor of Sustainable 
Communities, Department of Urban and Environmental Planning, School of 
Architecture, University of Virginia
Thursday Lunchtime Session:  William Ross, Secretary, North Carolina 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources:  Overview of Preserva-
tion Planning with One NC Naturally Conservation Planning Tool
Six mobile workshops including tours of downtown Raleigh and Apex
25 sessions, including a plenary session on Everyday Ethics for Planners 
and a session featuring Carolina Planning Journal contributors
A bicycle tour, a golf tournament, and much more--save the date!
2008 NCAPA Conference
